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Global Euro. Testing Times for Transatlantic Ties? 
 
Miriam Campanella ♦
 
 
Abstract 
Theories of international cooperation (TIC) predict that deeper economic integration raises the 
costs of policy conflicts and promotes coordination.  As the US-EU economy makes up 60 per 
cent of the world GDP, policymakers on the two sides of the Atlantic are expected to assign 
highest priority to joint policy action.     
Angela Merkel‘s resumption of TAFTA with the objective of fixing   some regulatory issues, 
offers comfort to TIC’s tenets.  Though, the correction of the global imbalances and especially 
the huge US external deficit does not add as much of comfort to TIC’s tenets.  A likely 
overshooting of dollar’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro will bring huge consequences on euro 
zone economies.  While TIC’s supporters  would call for  transatlantic  mechanism to arbitrate 
and coordinate monetary policy to offset   potentially huge spillover effects, this paper   would 
suggest  EMU institutions to  prepare for  exchange rate shock adopting a policy of risk 
management, rather  than  banking on   implausible  transatlantic  coordination.   
 
Key-words: 
Transatlantic economy, global imbalances, competitive dollar, impact on euro economies, EMU 
institutions. 
 
Transatlantic Economy and Global Imbalances. 
 
The transatlantic relationship is often overshadowed by press reports about political bickering and 
commercial frictions. Figures published by Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan from the Center 
for Transatlantic Relations (CFTR) put the transatlantic economy on a different picture. Two-way 
trade and capital flows are currently worth $3 trillion – or around 60% of the world’s GDP – and 
employs 14 million workers both in the EU and the US. Trade and investment flows between the 
world’s two largest economies are thriving. In fact, despite all the clamors about the new Asian 
Giants, in 2005, the US invested in China only 23% of what it invested in Belgium. Even in slow-
growth Germany, investment from the US was four times higher than in China. As Daniel 
Hamilton, director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations of the Johns Hopkins University 
"Everyone talks about China but the action is actually somewhere else”. During the first half of 
this year, U.S. companies invested $51 billion in Europe, up 53% for the same period in 2005.  
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  3Although the jump was in part due to a one-off U.S. tax change allowing companies to 
repatriate foreign earnings, the U.S. continues to invest more in Europe than in China. Total U.S. 
investment in China last year was $1.6 billion, just about a quarter of U.S. investment in Belgium. 
U.S. investment in Germany was about four-and-a-half times larger than U.S. investment in 
China last year, the report adds. U.S. companies earned $106 billion in Europe last year, the 
report says. That compares to only $50.4 billion in Asia. Europe also is a key investor in the U.S. 
European investment in the U.S. totaled $108 billion in 2005, a 76% jump from the previous year. 
European subsidiaries in the U.S. earned $77 billion in 2005, up from $14 billion in 2001. To an 
important degree, corporate Europe's earning boom has been 'Made in America'.  
Though, a major risk to transatlantic economy is to take this relationship for granted. As 
promising as sounds the Angela Merkel’s initiative at relaunching the transatlantic free-trade 
area, global imbalances and the correction of the US external deficit as could put to severe testing 
economic and political relations between the two sides of the Atlantic.   
The working of globalization has indeed increased international trade and capital 
mobility, though it has accrued to the potential to provide both the   benefits of more efficient 
international allocation of production and capital, and greater cross-border risks.  In the last ten 
years, global financial integration has  set in motion   larger and  persistent global current account 
imbalances, as it shows in  the build-up  of the huge  trade and current account deficits, especially 
in the US, and significant surpluses in Asia and oil countries (Chart 1). 
 
Chart 1. Current account balances in US dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4Correction of such imbalances  are set to have consequences   beyond  those countries 
that must reduce external gaps,  and  will  extend to those countries that are linked through trade 
and finance to the adjusting economies. Europe, which in the aggregate is  not a major contributor 
to global current account imbalances,  and maintain   trade and financial linkages with  both 
groups, might result  especially vulnerable to  changes in the current configuration of external 
deficits and surpluses (Ahearne and von Hagen, 2005;Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006). As the way 
to the correction has taken the dollar’s steady depreciation, and euro and sterling appreciate more 
than other currencies, European economies, and especially euro zone, are above all exposed to 
face consequences (Figure 1, Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. Euro-dollar exchange rate (ECB 2007 b). 
 
igure 2. sterling/dollar, sterling/euro exchange rates  
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  5In addition to trade linkages and net capital flows, a weak dollar could impact on the 
balance sheets of European firms, governments, and households as highly vulnerable to the 
changes
s a Weak dollar the Best One Way out? 
change markets and strong at home, is for Martin 
Feldstein of Harvard the most effective way to reduce the US current account deficit. For a 
 in exchange rates and asset prices, as the dollar’s slide will reflect mainly on those 
European economies mostly exposed   to the US dollar with implications for the value of their 
external holdings (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2006:4)
1. Though, the United States, in terms of the 
overall international investment position, accounted   for only 17 percent of the aggregate cross-
border holdings of Europe in 2004, reflecting the predominance of intra-European cross-holdings 
in the total, “the United States is easily the most important extra-European destination for 
European investors: for instance, according to ECB data, it accounted in 2004 for 39 percent of 
the foreign equity holdings of euro area investors and 34 percent of the foreign bond holdings (the 
shares for FDI and other investment are lower at 22 percent and 14 percent respectively)” (Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006:8). The United States is the major extra-European destination for 
outward investment from Europe, with the scale of the engagement growing rapidly over the last 
two decades. These financial linkages provide a potentially important transmission mechanism by 
which fluctuations in financial returns in the United States affect the wealth of European 
investors. 
 
I
A competitive dollar, weak on foreign ex
competitive dollar to succeed the US Administration insistence on changes in the dollar-yuan 
bilateral exchange rate is inadequate, as China’s exports to US are responsible for only a fraction 
of US trade deficit. Feldstein points straight to a drop of  the “overall international value of the 
dollar”, which implies that in an environment of few free-floating currencies major exchange rate 
shock will hit the European currency. To the dollar to work as an effective channel of correction, 
the Fed’s monetary policy should play a crucial role in the game. Fed’s policy should tackle 
closely domestic inflation, dumping unmistakably   its second growth-employment mandate. 
Feldstein is adamant about  rising interest rates, this  should not harm U.S. exports, as even with a 
strong dollar, US  has ranked  high in export performance, exporting in 2005, $892 billion worth 
of goods, including $450 billion of capital goods, $116 billion of consumer goods and $230 
billion of industrial supplies and materials. “A lower dollar would raise sales volume in all of 
these categories” (Feldstein 2006:7). Though, U.S. manufacturers would still generally be unable 
to compete with producers in low-wage countries, “nearly half of US imports come from high-
wage Europe, Canada and Japan.  So that a dollar that is more competitive will favor American 
consumers to buy U.S.-made products instead of imports from those countries” (ibid.). The 
Feldstein ‘s exit strategy  is built strongly  in domestic framework  rather then in  multilateral 
joint policy action  of the kind  experienced  at the Plaza and Louvre  accords of the 80s. Though, 
Feldstein warns that is not a guarantee that a dollar decline now would not raise inflation. For a 
sharp dollar decline with no adverse effect on inflation
 (2006:7), the Federal Reserve should 
tackle closely inflationary pressures.  As business investment is unlikely to rise faster when sales 
to consumers are declining and housing construction is already in decline, the key to maintaining 
aggregate demand, i.e., the key to  expansion if consumer spending slows, “must be a shift in the 
trade balance - increased exports, lower imports and more spending on goods and services 
produced in the U.S. For this, the dollar must decline to make U.S. goods and services more 
attractive” (Feldstein, 2006:7). The Feldstein’s strategy seems perfectly in tune with the US 
Federal Reserve policymakers more concerned about inflation than tepid economic growth 
(Washington Post, May 10, 2007).  
  
  6How Resilient are Euro Area Economies to a Weak Dollar?  
ident Rodrigo de Rato warned 
uropean policymakers to avoid too much complacency about global imbalances, and the 
), the ECB 
President Jean-Claude Trichet insisted on three factors of convergence in the euro zone as a 
success
e euro zone economy (J-C Trichet 2007) 
tage points from 1 
percentage point in 1999.  An inflation dispersion practically the same as that in the US (14 US 
rsion on annual average terms has declined from a 2 percentage 
points to slightly below 1.5 percentage points, which does not appear to be significantly different 
ss cycle has increased since 
the beginning of the 1990s.   In 2006, the economic rebound in the euro area’s real GDP growth 
os, divergences in the euro 
one could indeed intensify in a phase of upward cycle:   
deviation of the growth rates of the 
euro area members has barely moved  as the large three euro area members tended to move 
broa
hrough a 
‘competitive deflation’, i.e. extracting continuous concessions from trade unions on labor costs, is 
impossi
Gros predicts that idiosyncratic features and weak resiliency to global 
competition will surface strongly in the next half of this decade because, which will show in the 
North a
 evolution of the Harmonized 
 
In a speech to the Washington European Institute, IMF Pres
E
evolution of   US adjustment. “While Europe so far has not been at the center of the problem of 
widening external imbalances, it should be part of the solution”. The fact that the euro area's 
current account balance has been small and stable while imbalances have grown elsewhere is no 
assurance that it can escape the fallout from a disorderly adjustment - especially given the 
growing international role of the euro. The question how much resilient   are euro zone 
economies to a weaker dollar and reduced U.S. imports brings to the fore the degree of 
convergence, and   the sources of persisting divergences within euro area economies. 
In a recent conference before the European Parliament (February 2007
-story of the euro (Box 1).  
Box 1. Factors of convergence in th
  1. Inflation. In 2006, inflation dispersion reached a level of 0.7 percen
Metropolitan Statistical Areas).  
  2. Output.  The degree of dispe
than that observed across regions or states within the United States.  
   3. Synchronization of business cycles. Across the euro area busine
was widely shared across the various countries within the euro area.  
 
Though, divergences are as much important.  For Daniel Gr
z
 
If during  1999 and now, the weighted standard 
dly together, in the second half of the decade growth differentials  will show  off. 
Despite some superficial developments between Germany and Italy, it is now becoming 
clear that a chasm has opened up between them under the surface (Gros 2006:1-2).  
 
Gros points out  that the way Germany has regained competitiveness t
ble to other  member countries, such as  Italy, which, instead, has continuously lost 
competitiveness with  labor costs  increase by about 20% relative to those of Germany since the 
introduction of the euro.  
 
Not surprisingly, 
nd the South of euro area diverging rather than converging. 
Early evidence of deterioration in price competitiveness of several euro economies are 
weighed up in the ECB February Bulletin 2007. It shows   that the
  7Compet
de in total cross-border trade is the lowest for Portugal 
(31%) and the highest for Ireland (almost 68%). In addition, the geographical allocation of extra-
euro ar
ntegration and Valuation Effects.  
e spillovers   could affect directly 
European investors. Financial integration represents after trade, a second key factor of 
itiveness Indicators (HCI)
2 across euro area countries between the first quarter of 1999 
and the fourth quarter of 2006 have recorded an increase in their HCIs, which points to 
deterioration in the price competitiveness of these countries. This is not surprising given that the 
corresponding measure of the euro Real Exchange Rate (REER) appreciated by 4.3% over this 
period. However, HCI changes differed substantially across countries. At one end of the 
spectrum, Germany, Austria and Finland experienced a moderate decline in their HCIs, indicating 
an improvement in their price competitiveness, whereas, at the other end, rises in the HCIs were 
particularly strong in Ireland and Spain. The countries that appeared to have improved their price 
competitiveness since 1999 are those that also recorded the lowest rates of inflation (Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Price) during this period, while inflation in Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal has been well above the euro area average. The country-specific pattern of foreign trade 
flows determines the relevance of both changes in foreign consumer prices and exchange rate 
developments. Concerning exchange rate developments, the extent to which a change in the euro 
exchange rate affects the HCI of a particular euro area country is closely related to the exposure 
of that country to extra-euro area trade.  
The share of extra-euro area tra
ea trade of each euro area country also affects HCI developments. For example, the 
appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar over the past two years has had a rather strong 
impact on the HCI of Ireland, because a relatively large share of the foreign trade of that country 
is with the United States. On balance, the impact of euro exchange rate fluctuations affects 
variously member economies and works at revealing the different rates of vulnerability to 
exchange rates dynamic.  
Transatlantic Financial I
Financial integration is a further channel through which negativ
transatlantic economy. The U.S. and EU together account for about 70 percent of global equity 
capitalization - about $16 trillion in the U.S. and $10 trillion in the EU. The two-way flow of 
trade, portfolio, and direct investment between our two regions exceeds $1 trillion annually. Of 
the top 500 companies in the world, 358 are based in the transatlantic market, including 19 of the 
top 20. The recent historic enlargement of the EU by 10 new Member States has only magnified 
the region's importance to the United States - the EU now has 450 million potential investors and 
a GDP exceeding $12 trillion. In comparison, the U.S. population totals 280 million, with a GDP 
almost reaching $12.2 trillion. Financial globalization has grown rapidly – the ratio of foreign 
assets and liabilities to GDP has grown by a factor of 3.5 over 1984-2004 (from 130 percent to 
over 450 percent). Financial globalization in recent years, with the increase in holdings of foreign 
assets and liabilities across the Atlantic means that “the transmission mechanism by which 
external adjustment in the U.S. affects Europe has become more far-reaching” (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2006:4-5).  Changes in exchange rates and asset prices will clearly impact on the balance 
sheets of European firms, governments, and households. 
 
 
 
  8Figure 2:  Financial Integration of Europe (from Lane and Milesi-Feretti, 2006) 
 
The figure above also shows that the bilateral financial position vis-à-vis the United 
States has grown at only a marginally slower pace. This suggests that the importance for the 
wealth 
Euro-Dollar Cooperation:  Fallacies and Downside. 
obal imbalances originate from a global 
ving glut,   the US correction is going on through a steady fall of the dollar.  An abrupt fall of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of European investors of movements in the value of U.S. assets and the dollar against 
European currencies has grown sharply over this period.  “In terms of the overall international 
investment position, the United States accounted for only 17 percent of the aggregate cross-
border holdings of Europe in 2004, reflecting the predominance of intra-European cross-holdings 
in the total. However, the United States is easily the most important extra-European destination 
for European investors: for instance, according to ECB data, it accounted in 2004 for 39 percent 
of the foreign equity holdings of euro area investors and 34 percent of the foreign bond holdings 
(the shares for FDI and other investment are lower at 22 percent and 14 percent 
respectively).”(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2006: 8-9 ). 
 
 
Consistently with the Bernanke’s explanation that gl
sa
the dollar, though, would have consequences especially on the euro, causing an exchange rate 
shock on those economies mostly exposed to the dollar.  Intra-euro conflicts are likely to stir 
protectionist demands, eventually putting to the test transatlantic ties.   This train of   
consequences would push, - as popular wisdom and TIC sustainers alike advocate-,  for more  
euro-dollar cooperation and  coordination, eventually setting up some  transatlantic  mechanisms.   
Is this the only way left?  Rogoff‘s heretical answer is no. He remarks that: 
  9monetary policy coordination, no matter how well they are designed and no matter 
how seamlessly they are implemented, brings to  small advantage compared with the 
overall potential benefits that would flow from having (..) central banks simply follow 
good
e 
dol ount deficit at 3 per cent of GDP?  For 
the dollar’s depreciation to reduce the trade deficit at 3 percent of GDP, estimates range between 
a 20 per  
esistance to participation in the adjustment process, 
subsequent acceleration of the inevitable portfolio diversification from dollars to euros and 
perh
 
ly 
des sion. 
 
licy equipped to 
counter negative consequences?  
 and von Hagen (2005) warn that  failure of the ECB  to act 
promptl
 domestic monetary policies (Rogoff 2003:1-2).   
 
A first question relates the likelihood of a dollar-euro exchange rate shock.  How far th
lar’s depreciation should go to bring the US current acc
cent depreciation of the dollar from where it was in January 2007 to 15%.  Baily (2007)  
empirical analysis based on historical experience of US trade and the dollar over the past 25 years 
reaches the conclusion that a further depreciation of between 15 and 20 percent on the Fed’s real 
broad dollar index would be needed to reach a trade deficit roughly consistent with a three 
percent current account deficit (Baily 2007:3-6). On the euro’s side, with a nominal exchange rate  
appreciation  by 10 per cent against the dollar,  though  inflation and increase in unit labor costs  
have been lower than in other industrialized countries (with the exception of Japan), and much 
lower than in Asian economies, euro zone economies  have indeed  lost competitiveness since 
2002 (Dullien 2007).  So, even if the current level 1.36  (or even a level of $1.40) of the euro 
exchange rate might not pose excessive problems, there is not  much room for complacency, as 
foreign exchange markets could overshoot  with the  euro hiking  at $1.50 or $1.60.  At this point, 
euro overvaluation might hit companies and might slow growth and employment dynamics. On a 
similar tune, Bergsten (2005) warns that: 
 
three or four events—generalized further dollar depreciation, disproportionate euro 
appreciation due to continued Asian r
aps a positive shift in the relative economic appeal of Euroland vis-à-vis the United 
States—could produce a very large further rise in the euro (2005:14) .  
Such a scenario would indeed be extremely uncomfortable for euro zone and extreme
tabilizing for the world economy, perhaps even triggering a global reces
The second question relates to EMU institutions. Are ECB and European Commission 
ready   to deliver in face of an exchange rate shock?  The ECB monetary po
Relative to the ECB, Svensson (2004) considers that “[U]nder the present monetary 
policy paradigm, the euro appreciation is “a challenge for the monetary policy of the ECB and the 
Eurosystem”(2004: 4-5). Ahearne
y  vis-à-vis an exchange rate shock  could origin   erratic responses in the euro area   
“with an increased risk of a more protectionist response” (Ahearne and von Hagen 2006:1).   
Assessment of EMU policies is somewhat mixed.   Some analysts (Posen2005, Ahearne and von 
Hagen 2005) argue that EMU policymakers have acted rather pro-cyclically in the last five years.   
In 2001, the ECB showed an unresponsive attitude to the risk of deflation, at least compared with 
the Federal Reserve. For example, by the time of the first ECB interest rate cut in mid-2001, at 
which time the policy rate was trimmed 25 basis points to 4½ percent, the Federal Reserve had 
already carried out 250 basis points of easing. As a result, in mid-2001 real interest rates in the 
euro area, at about 2 per cent, were almost double the level in the US” (Ahearne and von Hagen, 
2006:18).  In 2003, the European Commission played wrongly the fines policy (Stability and 
Growth Pact) in a phase of serious slowdown and recession in the euro zone (Posen 2005). So, 
concerns that   it might hinder a sufficiently strong fiscal reaction to exchange rate shock, 
especially one that would be forward-looking in the sense of acting quickly when the dollar 
declines fast (Ahearne and von Hagen 2006: 18). Furthermore, how will the European 
 10Commission act if the ensuing recession is asymmetric across euro countries, there may be more 
tension in the European Council between the countries strongly affected that desire a large fiscal 
response and those less affected that will insist on staying within the SGB limits? Aherane and 
von Hagen argue that the European Commission “might reveal slow to provide the leadership 
necessary in such situations” (2006:9-10). 
As a result, inconsistent responses, slow delivery, and lack of leadership might open to 
erratic responses and individual/collective protectionist measures, which can disrupt transatlantic 
relations.  What should be done to prevent this worst case scenario to materialize? Conventional 
respons
  The United States must launch a serious program to cut its budget deficit to increase national 
es would endorse the precepts of the theory of international cooperation.  The Bergsten’s 
4 steps strategy (Box 2) depicts perfectly the TIC sophisticated paradigm. The aim is, of course, 
to manage an orderly correction of the global payments imbalances and an orderly further 
depreciation of the dollar, rather than a hard-landing, and hence an exchange rate shock (Box 2).  
 
Box 2. Bergsten 4 steps-strategy in pills. 
 
•
saving, and thus reduce its dependence on foreign capital. 
  The G-7 (especially Euroland) must insist that the International Monetary Fund implement its  •
rules against currency manipulation and require China, in particular, to cease the competitive 
undervaluation of its currency. 
• J apan and (especially) Europe must stimulate domestic demand to affect the decline in their 
external surpluses, but also through a lowering of interest rates by the European   Central 
Bank (which the euro appreciation will help to permit). 
•  Euroland and the United States, as the issuers of the world’s two key currencies, must create 
a new “finance G-2” to manage exchange rate volatility.  
 
 
The first step is done: the Bush Administration has planned balancing the Federal budget 
ithin 2012. The second step would require enforcement policy lacking to the IMF, and outright 
pelled by China’s authorities. Third step looks tricky. By limiting to Europe: How would the 
EC
 accords of the 1980s, announced with great fanfare by 
e top industrial powers, were aimed at achieving sustainable parities, thereby avoiding 
¾ 
investment and equities and vice versa, Europe and the United 
 
w
re
B justify reduction of interest rate, at a time of overshooting M3, positive growth cycle, and 
after a long pause of accommodative interest rates?  Step four falls into the Rogoff’s analysis of 
the fallacies of coordination.  As he remarks grandiose schemes have been designed   since the 
shift to floating exchange rates in the early 1970s. Leading economists have suggested “grandiose 
mechanism and institutions for guiding global monetary policy” (2003:1). At their roots, 
however, are at least two major fallacies: 
 
¾  “International monetary policy coordination always leads to less exchange rate volatility. Not 
necessarily. (..) The Plaza and Louvre
th
disorderly adjustments and excessive volatility. The results were mixed. But even if 
significant exchange rate stabilization were achievable—and given today's large and moody 
foreign exchange markets, it may not be—it is far from obvious that such a policy is always 
desirable” (Rogoff, 2003:2). 
 “The stronger the international financial links, the stronger the need for institutionalized 
coordination. In other words, the argument goes, as Europeans boost their holdings of U.S. 
assets through direct foreign 
States will have a greater direct interest in each other's growth. With greater potential 
international spillover effects, there needs to be greater coordination of monetary policy. But 
 11this isn't necessarily the case. International investment and equity linkages already enhance 
authorities' incentives to look at the global effects of their national monetary policies, with or 
without centralized cooperation” (Rogoff, 2003:2-3).  
Fallacies are not all the story.  Cooperation could reserve downside, too. In opposition to 
e who want to institutionalize joint monetary policy d
 
thos ecision making, Rogoff warns  that  “a 
ush to create a new cooperative international monetary policy institution might provoke a 
poli
hairman Jean-Claude Juncker has just blown up on ECB   exchange policy, and the 
p
tical debate that could cause to give up  some of the big gains of recent years: reducing central 
bank independence”(Rogoff, 2003:2). Is it this an outcome to welcome? Or, could it work as an 
expedient to attack central bank independence, and with it monetary stability enjoyed in last 
decades?    
  
 
Eurogroup C
French new president   Nicolas Sarkozy    in a television interview   attacked ECB President Jean-
Claude Trichet's policy of allowing the euro to appreciate against other currencies. Sarkozy called 
Europe's exchange policy "incomprehensible." "The Germans don't agree and the Prime Minister 
of Luxembourg who presides over the Eurogroup, Mr. Juncker (...) threatened to resign if Mr. 
Trichet continued," with the bank's monetary policy, he said. "The Americans push the dollar 
down to favor growth.(..)The Japanese and Chinese do the same."  Sarkozy then went on ask, 
"Why create the world's second currency if it's not to use it?” 
 
In conclusion.  
     
At odds with TIC’ tenets that cooperation is the best one way to fix negative spillovers, this paper 
p to domestic monetary institutions on two sides of the Atlantic  to cope with 
ative spillovers,  gearing  up to  risk management  approach rather than  taking  refuge  in 
sustains that is u
neg
complacency, or, after Rogoff, in “grandiose schemes”, as they  are more likely  to backfire 
putting to the test transatlantic ties. 
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